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Abstract: This paper analyses imperfect competition in a spatial model that is applied to the European 
dairy industry. We show how imperfect competition can be introduced within the dairy industry model 
developed by Bouamra et al. (2002). We then simulate four scenarios that differ in the assumptions on 
competition. We show that the existence of market power significantly modifies the implicit price of 
milk components, may lead to an increase in EU exports and that domestic prices are not adequate 
indicators of competitiveness in the presence of market power. Distribution in surplus among agents is 
changed and large welfare losses may be generated. 
 




Most models used to analyze the economic impact of agricultural policies consider that agricultural 
markets work in a perfectly competitive framework. If this assumption seems reasonable as long as 
one deal with agricultural raw products at a country level (or at the EU level), this assumption is more 
questionable when analysing international trade and/or food markets (that is processed product 
markets). It is particularly the case for the analysis of dairy policies which directly act on processed 
product markets. Thus, it is important to develop analysis of agricultural policy that integrates some 
aspects of imperfect competition. The aim of this contribution is to focus on the introduction of 
imperfect competition in spatial models applied to the dairy sector.  
A short review of literature defines where we stand. Then, we provide some evidence of imperfect 
competition in the dairy sector. In the third section, we develop a simplified model for the dairy 
industry in the EU that integrates imperfect competition. The fourth section presents and discusses the 
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simulation results for different competitive framework. And finally, we summarize the main findings 
in the concluding part. 
 
1. A brief review of the literature on imperfect competition in spatial models 
 
Most of spatial equilibrium models assume perfect competition. Thus, they do not take into account 
the non competitive effects that may arise because of the existence of oligopolies on markets. The 
existence of oligopolistic behaviour on markets may influence market equilibrium and qualifies the 
existing models results.  
However, there exist few spatial oligopolistic market models.  A first attempt has been developed by 
Takayama and Judge (1971) who considered a spatial monopoly market model and analyse how 
market equilibrium was modified compared to the perfectly competitive spatial model. In their setting, 
they assumed that the same firm operates in all the regions. When resale among regions is not 
possible, then the monopolist discriminates price among regions. They showed that when there is trade 
from region i to region j then the marginal revenue of the firm in market j is exactly equal to the 
marginal cost of the firm in region i plus the transportation cost from i to j. Note that in the perfect 
competition framework, the equality is between the price in market j and the marginal cost of the firm 
in region i plus the transportation cost from i to j. Obviously, in the monopoly case, prices are higher 
and productions are lower than in the perfect competition case. Takayama and Judge also explored 
monopoly pricing rule when resale among regions is possible (that is assuming that arbitrage is 
possible). This imposes additional constraint for the monopoly, namely prices among regions cannot 
differ more than the transportation cost between the considered regions.  Hashimoto (1984) has 
extended the model proposed by Takayama and Judge and developed a spatial Nash non cooperative 
equilibrium model. He considered that there is one firm per region which competes à la Cournot with 
the other firms. A comparison of the Nash equilibrium model with the perfect competitive and the 
monopoly models shows that the differentials in interregional prices in the Nash equilibrium are 
greater than in the perfect equilibrium framework and lower than in the monopoly case. Hashimoto 
also showed that market equilibriums (demand, supply, prices) are modified and that the trade flows 
may differ from one framework to the other. In the non competitive setting, trade between regions 
depends not only on transportation costs but also on additional margins that are proportional to the 
level of imports.  
Nelson and McCarl (1984) proposed a modified version of the spatial equilibrium model to analyse an 
oligopoly model. They discussed how to integrate different market structures (Cournot, Stackelberg 
and conjectural variations). The methodology consists in modifying the perfect equilibrium framework 
by adding a condition of maximisation of firms’ profits that take into account the strategic interactions 
between firms. However, they assumed that all firms (one firm in each region) have identical costs and 
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that transportation costs are zero. This considerably reduces the empirical attractiveness of their 
model. More recently, Yang, Hwang and Sohng (2002) have extended the symmetric spatial Cournot 
competition model developed in the literature to heterogeneous demand and cost functions. In 
particular, they defined necessary conditions for the uniqueness of solution. They applied it to the US 
coal market.  
However, the implementation of imperfect competitive framework in applied models is still not well 
studied. In the food sector, Kawaguchi, Suzuki and Kaiser (1997) have applied an imperfectly 
competitive spatial equilibrium model to the dairy industry in Japan using the general methodology 
developed by Nelson and McCarl (1984) and Hasimoto (1984). They took into account the 
specificities of the Japan milk market organization. In particular, they distinguished the fluid milk 
market from manufacturing milk market. Market power on the fluid milk market is analysed while 
quota and guaranteed price prevails on the manufacturing milk market. Moreover, they integrated the 
pooled price policy used in this country. They found that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium solutions were 
more similar to actual observations compared to the monopoly case or to the perfectly competitive 
framework.  
It should be stressed that under a perfect competition framework, trade between regions is always one-
way trade. On the contrary, with an imperfect competition framework (and homogenous products), 
two-way trade occurs in numerous cases. This framework is thus one of the possible explanations of 
two-way trade frequently observed. Note that another important explanation is related to product 
differentiation. Numerous empirical models are built upon the seminal work of Armington (1969). 
As shown by Brander and Krugman (1983), from a theoretical point of view, different situations may 
occur from no trade to bilateral trade given the market structure, the production and trade costs, and 
the pattern of demand in each country as well as policy instruments. 
2. Some evidence of imperfect competition in the EU dairy sector 
 
The concentration of the dairy industry in the European Union is diverse. It depends on the country as 
well as on the product. We provide in Table 1 some ratio of concentration for some EU countries.  
 
Thus concentration ratio considerably varies among countries as well as products. It seems that 
concentration is higher in France and UK as compared to Germany and Italy. We do not have statistics 
on the Netherlands or Denmark but it is very likely that concentration ratios are higher in these two 
countries as production is dominated by one or two large cooperatives. 
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Table 1. - Level of concentration of dairy processors (year 2002) 
  Germany Italy France UK 
Liquid Milk     
CR-3  56.2 63.0 73.0 
CR-6 49.8    
Butter     
CR-3 24.3 26.1 46.0 87.0 
Powders     
CR-3 40.4 - 40.0  
CR-4    67.6 
All cheeses     
CR-3   48.0  
CR-8    74.0 
CR-10   76.0  
CR-16 49.3    
Hard cheese     
CR-3  22.6 60.0  
Source: contributions of EDIM project researchers 
 
It also should be stressed that concentration in the cheese industry is significantly higher as soon as we 
consider separately the main cheese categories. This directly questions the definition of the relevant 
market. To illustrate this point, Table 2 provides information on the concentration ratio in the French 
cheese industry.  
 
Table 2. - Concentration ratio in the French cheese industry (2000) 
  CR-4 HHI 
All cheeses 39.5% 570 
Hard cheese 60.2% 1233 
Semi-Hard cheese 39.1% 590 
Soft cheese 61.9% 1374 
Blue cheese 66.4% 1242 
Fresh cheese 63.2% 1262 
Processed cheese 89.9% 3748 
Source: Chaaban, 2004. 
 
To our knowledge, very few works analyzed the issue of imperfect competition for the EU dairy 
sector. The imperfect competition issue has received relatively low attention by European agricultural 
economists while this topic has received more attention for the US market. As McCorriston (2002) 
underlines, imperfect competition should not be neglected since evidence suggests that agricultural 
markets in Europe are oligopolistic and, in particular, there is a growing market power of retailers. 
Hence, if imperfect competition is important, it has implication also in the way government’s 
agricultural policies are designed and evaluated. 
Some works evaluate the degree of price transmission in the industry. Only few directly tests for 
market power. Milan (1999) studies the structure of 18 food industries in Spain for the period 1978-
1992. The estimated Learner index shows the existence of market power for most of the industries, 
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where the dairy industry rank ninth with a value of 0.072 significantly different from zero. Gohin and 
Guyomard (2000) focus on the retail level. According to their results, more than 20 percent of the 
wholesale-to-retail price margin for dairy products can be attributed to market power distortions. To 
get a more complete view, the reader should refer to Bouamra-Mechemache, Réquillart and Soregaroli 
(2004).  
3. A spatial equilibrium model of the European dairy industry 
 
3.1 Perfect competition assumption  
We first present the spatial equilibrium model of the European dairy industry developed by Bouamra 
et al. (2002). It integrates the whole channel of the EU dairy industry from the supply of milk to the 
demand for final commodities through an intermediate step of processing milk into final commodities. 
It is an hedonic (milk characteristics), spatial equilibrium model which integrates an agricultural 
product (cow milk), 2 milk components (fat and protein), the different member states (14) and the rest 
of the world, and 14 final dairy products. The model integrates the EU dairy policy instruments that 
include milk production quota, intervention prices as floor prices for butter and SMP domestic 
markets, domestic subsidies for industrial uses of butter and SMP, a production subsidy for casein, 
export subsidies and import tariff rate quotas for each final dairy product as well as direct decoupled 
payments (June 2003 Luxemburg agreement).  Moreover, GATT import and export commitments are 
explicitly modelled. We now formally present the model.  
The inverse supply function for milk in region i is denoted  with the quantity of 
milk collected. We denote the constant marginal cost for collecting milk in each region. Because 
milk is a bulk product, we do not allow trade of raw milk between regions.  
)( ii XS iX
xc
We denote  the production of the processed commodity k in region i. Production of 
commodity k involves two basic components (fat and protein) that are an integral part of raw milk and 
that are “rearranged” and allocated among processed commodities. We denote 
kiY ,
si,α  the quantity of the 
sth component per unit of raw milk produced in region i and sk ,γ  the quantity of the s
th component per 
unit of processed commodity k. Note that milk composition varies across regions while composition of 
final commodities does not. Final commodities are traded among regions and are assumed to be 
homogenous. Under a Leontief technology, the transformation of the raw milk into processed 
commodities must satisfy: 
 
   (1) siXY siik skki ,,,, ∀≤∑ αγ
 
Equation (1) ensures the balance in the allocation of component s in region i. Besides milk 
components, the production of commodity k also involves labour and capital inputs, which are 
provided at a constant marginal cost . We assume that processing costs are identical among regions.  kc
 - 5 - 
The inverse demand function for each final commodity k in region i is denoted  
where  denotes the consumption of commodity k in region i. Similarly, the net import demand 
function from the rest of the world is denoted  where  denotes the consumption 
of commodity k in the rest of the world. 
)( ,, kiki ZD
kiZ ,
)( ,, krowkrow ZD krowZ ,
Trade across regions involves transportation cost. We assume a constant marginal cost for 
transportation of commodity k from region i to region j and denote it . Intra-trade flows, denoted 
by , represent the quantity of commodity k that is transported from region i to region j. Note 
that  is the quantity of commodity k that is both produced and consumed in the same region i. 
Similarly extra-trade flows, denoted by , represent the quantity of commodity k that is exported 
from region i to the rest of the world in the export regime ex. We distinguish subsidized exports 
(ex = “sub”) from non subsidized exports (ex = “nsub”). The per-unit export subsidy for commodity k 





exkES , kES nsubk ∀= ,0"", . The trade flow constraints across regions are: 
 
kiYXEXD kiex exkij kji ,,,,,, ∀≤+∑∑     (2) 
kiXDZ
j kijki
,,,, ∀≤∑       (3) 
∑ ∀≤ exi exkikrow kXEZ , ,,,       (4) 
 
In any region, these equations guarantee that exports plus domestic use cannot be larger than domestic 
production (equation 2), and that domestic consumption cannot exceed domestic production plus 
imports (equation (3) and equation (4)).  
The model includes milk quota in each region i denoted by iX . We thus write the milk quota 
constraint as:  
 
    iXX ii ∀≤ .     (5) 
 
We also introduce a constraint on the volume of subsidized exports denoted by kEX . We thus have:  
 
    kEXXE ki subki ∀≤∑ "",,      (6) 
 
As a basis for representing resource allocation, we consider the following optimization problem: 
 
 













































 Subject to (1)-(6), . 0,0,0,0,0 ,,,,,, ≥≥≥≥≥ exkikjikikii XEXDZYX
 
 














































































si λλλλλλ ski ,,∀ , are the Lagrange multipliers 
associated to constraints (1) to (6).  
 





































































































   (13b) ki,∀
 
Interpreting  as the unit quota rent in region i, equation (8) implies that when production is positive, 
the farm-gate price of milk, that is equal to the marginal cost plus the unit quota rent, is equal to the 
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producer price for commodity k in region i. Similarly, from equations (10) and (11),  and  are 





Equation (12) states that if trade occurs from region i to region j, then the difference between the 
consumer price in region j and the producer price in region i is equal to the transportation cost between 
the two regions. Equation (13b) is equivalent to equation (12) in the context of international trade. 
Equation (13a) shows that export subsidy acts in the opposite direction of transportation costs. In 
addition, when the WTO constraint on subsidized exports is binding, an additional cost appears that 
corresponds to the shadow value associated to the constraint.  
 
3.2 Imperfect competition assumption 
We now assume that only few firms are active on some final commodity markets. These firms 
therefore exert some market power which we want to take into account. We assume a Cournot-Nash 
competition that is firms choose strategically their level of production. A firm can act on different 
markets in two ways. First, a firm can sell a given product in the different regions. Alternatively, a 
given firm can sell different products in a given region. As marginal costs are assumed to be constant 
in our setting (neither scale nor scope economies) and demands are independent, the maximisation 
program of a firm on a given market is then separable in all the choice variables (quantities sold on the 
different markets). 
 
Formally, the maximisation program of a firm in region i which produces different 









































with the price of component s in region I and sip , ∑= ex exkiki xexe ,,, .  
 
We thus consider that firms do not exert oligopsony power. Quantities produced by a firm are denoted 
in lower case letter while aggregate quantities are in upper case letter. Assuming that there are  
identical firms producing k on market in region i, we get 
kin ,
kikjikji nXDxd ,,,,, = . First order conditions 
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As it can be seen from above, firms consider each country as a separate market and its marginal 
revenue in a market is achieved independently of the other markets. If firms behave as “price takers” 










. The marginal revenue of firm i 











. Market prices will be higher than marginal revenue, which allows for some 
markup to the oligopolistic firms. 
 
In order to introduce imperfect competition behaviour among firms or regions, the literature shows 
that the objective function has to be adjusted in such a way that the first order conditions of the model 
will now reflect the conditions of firms’ profit maximization under strategic interaction. 
Using conditions (14a and 14b), the model can be rewritten as the following maximizing 

























































































   (15) 
Subject to (1)-(6), . 0,0,0,0,0 ,,,,,, ≥≥≥≥≥ exkikjikikii XEXDZYX
 









































∑∫∑∫ .  
 
When the market is perfectly competitive, this term is equal to zero and the maximization 
program is consistent with model (7). If firms behave like Cournot-Nash competitors, then using (14a) 
and (14b) and the equality between marginal cost and marginal revenue, this term represents the total 
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markup in the different markets. As shown by Kawaguchi, Suzuki and Kaiser (1997), other strategic 
interactions can be integrated in the model (in particular one can use the conjectural variations in order 
to model other strategies).  
Solving for the Khun and Tucker conditions leads to the first order conditions (8) – (11) found 
in the perfect competition framework. However, conditions (12), (13a) and (13b) are modified to take 
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Equations (16), (17a) and (17b) differ from (12), (13a) and (13b) by the last term in the right hand side 
of the equations that reflects the margins on the considered trade activity. Note that the lower the 
number of firms acting in the domestic country is, the larger is the associated markup. 
 
3.3 Application to the dairy sector 
We develop a simplified version of the dairy spatial equilibrium model presented above, involving 
only two European Union regions, a northern European region (NORTH) that includes Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom and a southern 
European region (SOUTH) that is composed of Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain. In addition to these two aggregates of the EU countries, we consider a net demand for 
imports from the rest of the world. 
The simplified model includes two commodity aggregates. First, we consider the aggregation 
of “industrial products” (IND). This aggregate is composed of butter, skim milk powder, whole milk 
powder, condensed milk and casein. The second commodity is the aggregation of “final consumption 
commodities” (FCT) which includes cheese, liquid milk, cream and fresh products.  
The empirical model has been developed from observed data in year 2000 at the member state level 
and at the commodity level. To compute the aggregation over commodities, we have calculated 
weighted sum for production, consumption and export quantities using the weighting coefficient kβ  
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that represents the share of the value of components in commodity k in the total value of components 














β   
 
The observed price as well as the technical coefficients of an aggregate of commodities in a given 
region is computed as the weighted average of prices of the involved commodities by their respective 
production share in the total production. 
We checked the validity of this simplified model on observed data in year 2000 in a perfect 
equilibrium framework. We then modified this validated simplified model to include imperfect 
competition assumptions using the methodology presented in the previous section. 
 
The following figure represents the market equilibrium when the final commodity product is 
produced by a monopoly when quotas are binding. We consider two demands for milk, the derived 
demand for industrial products (Dind) and the derived demand for final consumption product (Dfct). The 
aggregate demand for milk is thus (Dfct + Dind). The equilibrium price in a perfect competition 
framework is thus Ppc. The monopoly equilibrium occurs when the total marginal revenue curve in 
milk or component equivalent which is equal to the sum of marginal revenue from industrial final 
consumption commodities and the derived demand for industrial products (Dnd+MRfct), intersects the 
milk supply curve. When quotas are binding, the equilibrium price for industrial products given by pind 
is equal to the marginal cost of production at the equilibrium plus a positive quota rent. The price for 
final consumption commodities is obtained on the demand curve for FCT (Dfct). The actual price paid 
to milk producers is Pind assuming that milk producers get the quota rent. Then the price for farmers is 
given by Pind and processors of final commodity products get a rent equal to (Pfct- Pind).  
 
 






Dind MRfct Dfct 
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igure 1: Market equilibrium in a monopoly framework 
n the next section, we will compare the market equilibrium for different imperfect competition 
ituations. 
. Simulation results 
We compare the results from four scenarios which correspond to different assumptions on 
ompetition between firms. In scenario 1, perfect competition is assumed in the two regions and for 
he two products. This scenario is used as a reference scenario. In scenario 2, we assume that FCT is 
roduced by a monopoly in each region. In scenario 3, we assume that, in each region, FCT is 
roduced by 10 firms that compete à la Cournot. Finally in scenario 4, we assume that, in each region, 
CT and IND are produced by 10 firms which compete à la Cournot. Table 3 presents the main 
esults.  
 When only one firm produces FCT in each region, the milk quota is no longer binding and the 
quilibrium productions for final products change. Total production of FCT decreases while total 
roduction of IND increases. In both regions, firms reduce their production of FCT in order to take 
dvantage of their monopoly power. This has a negative effect on the milk price which induces an 
ncrease in the production of IND. The reduction in milk cost generates a decrease in the production 
ost and thus in the price of IND. Then the consumption increases in each region. However, the 
ncrease in IND production is only true at the aggregate level but not at the regional level. Finally, as 
he marginal cost of production for IND decreases, the EU exports of IND to the rest of the world 
ncrease compared to the perfect competition scenario. 
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The demand for FCT is highly inelastic and contrary to IND, FCT price dramatically increases. 
Another consequence is the increase in intra-trade. Note that there is some bilateral ‘dumping’ as each 
firm sells its product in the other EU region at a price lower than the price set in its own region. Even 
if the price of FCT is now dramatically higher than the world market price, the EU exports for FCT do 
not decrease as compared to the perfect competition case. This is because firms discriminate prices 
among countries. On the one hand, firms will reduce their exports on world market in order to take 
advantage of some market power (however, world markets are much more elastic than domestic ones, 
which limits the exercise of market power). On the other hand, milk price is lower and 
competitiveness of FCT has thus increased. This has a positive impact on the level of exports. 
Moreover, the presence of market power generates a dramatic change in milk component prices. Both 
products, IND and FCT, require the utilisation of the two milk components but in different 
proportions. FCT contains proportionally more protein and IND contains more fat. As a result, the 
demand for protein decreases more than the demand for fat as the production of FCT significantly 
falls. This induces an increase in the price of fat and a decrease in the price of protein. These changes 
in fat and protein prices lead to a decrease in farm milk price (as a result of the decrease in the global 
demand for milk) and to a decrease in the procurement cost of raw material for the two industries. 
Finally, the monopoly in FCT production entails a big change in welfare distribution. This is a 
consequence of the assumption on the elasticity of demand for FCT which allows huge mark-up on 
this market. However, as a consequence of market power, the farmer surplus is reduced, the consumer 
surplus is reduced, the processor surplus is increased, the taxpayer cost is increased following to the 
increase in exports and global welfare is reduced.  
 When the market power is lower (scenario 3), results are similar to the one of the second 
scenario. The market equilibrium is characterized by a reduction in milk price, a change in component 
prices, an increase in FCT price, larger EU exports and changes in the distribution of surplus as well as 
in global welfare. However, a closer looks reveals qualitative differences. Now, the decrease in FCT 
production is lower than in the monopoly case and the quotas on milk production are binding. 
Moreover, implicit quotas on components (fat and protein) also remain binding. This explains why the 
productions of IND and FCT remain constant in both regions (as compared to the reference scenario). 
In other terms, due to the quotas on milk production, the reference scenario implements a solution 
where the productions of IND and FCT are already restricted as compared to their level without 
quotas. The exercise of market power, which basically is to restrict production, thus uses a similar 
mechanism that is to limit production. In this case, the market equilibrium with market power is such 
that firms find profitable to use the totality of the milk quota and thus they do not restrict more the 
production of FCT. If the existence of some market power on FCT production does not change the 
quantity produced, it changes the implicit price of fat and protein. Due to the constraints on fat and 
protein, there exists a zone for which the exercise of market power has an impact on component 
 - 13 - 
prices, on quantities sold in each market and on trade but not on the total quantities that are produced. 
We get this result because we consider two components and only two products in this model. This 
constrains the solution as it would be the case if we had considered only one product using one raw 
material.  
When we consider that both sectors are subject to imperfect competition (scenario 4), we find similar 
results but which now apply to the two sectors. 
 
 
 Table 3. - Dairy market equilibrium for different assumptions on imperfect competition 
  
Scenario 1:  
Perfect competition 
Scenario 2:  
Monopoly for FCT 
Scenario 3:  
nFCT=10, nIND=• 
Scenario 4:  
nFCT=10, nIND=10 
  North South EU North South EU North South EU North South EU 
Price (€/unit)                         
MILK 0.273 0.278  0.159 0.189  0.220 0.224  0.21 0.219
FAT 2.60 1.82   4.19 2.83   4.49 3.83   3.53 3.24   
PTN 5.34 6.95   0.00 2.92   1.42 2.79   2.34 3.35   
IND 30.14 30.14   25.45 25.70   30.14 30.14   32.02 31.93   
FCT 46.06 48.86   84.19 84.19   48.28 48.28   48.28 48.28   
milk cost (€/kg)                 
IND 24.60 24.59   19.88 20.13   24.57 24.58   22.12 23.07   
FCT 25.00 27.80   12.71 17.94   18.17 20.56   18.21 20.57   
Quota rent 0.091 0.063   0.000 0.000   0.037 0.008   0.028 0.003   
Production                 
MILK 69718 45247   60920 39631   69718 45247   69718 45247   
IND 263 153   315 134   263 153   263 153   
FCT 545 342   343 299   545 342   545 342   
Consumption                 
IND 177 141   188 149   177 141   172 138   
FCT 464 396   329 287   456 398   456 398   
Trade in IND                 
from North 177 0   188 15   177 0   103 76   
from South 0 141   0 134   0 141   70 62   
to Row 86 12   112 0   86 12   85 22   
Trade in FCT                 
from North 464 54   179 147   320 192   320 192   
from South 0 342   150 140   136 205   136 205   
to Row 27 0   17 10   33 0   33 0   
Surplus (M€)                 
Farmer 12667 7711 20378 4855 3742 8597 8965 5240 14205 8312 5008 13320
Processor 0 0 0 16502 12732 29234 4155 1890 6045 5016 2308 7324
Consumer 36982 30633 67615 22730 19224 41954 35962 30863 66825 35634 30614 66248
Taxpayer   1742   1912   1853   1952
Welfare     86251     77874     85222     84940
 
In table 4, we briefly analyse the impact of removing export subsidies for the different competition 
assumptions. Results show that removing export subsidies increases welfare whatever the structure of 
the industry. The welfare gains rise with the exercise of market power. 
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However, in term of welfare, the exercise of market power in this sector of production characterized 
by rather low demand elasticities could cost as much as the price distortion induced by export 
subsidies. Indeed in our simulation, the presence of export subsidies leads to a net cost of around €1 
billion, which roughly corresponds to the cost in welfare from the market power exercised by an 
industry composed by 10 firms producing each commodity in each country. 
It does not mean that removing export subsidies is not a good policy, but that imperfect competition 
may also potentially be an important source of welfare losses.  
 
Table 4. - Dairy market equilibrium with no export subsidy for different assumptions on imperfect 
competition (M€) 
 Scenario 1:  
Perfect competition
Scenario 2:  
Monopoly for FCT
Scenario 3:  
nFCT=10, nIND=• 
Scenario 4:  
nFCT=10, nIND=10 
Surplus     
EU farmers 14255 7550 11202 10771 
EU processors 0 29001 6105 7488 
EU consumers 73070 42720 69192 68064 
EU Welfare 87325 79271 86499 86323 
Welfare loss due to 
imperfect competition 0 8054 826 1002 
Increase in welfare (due 
to export subsidy 
removal) 





The above analysis has shown how the introduction of market power in the spatial dairy industry 
model changes the market equilibrium characteristics. The main qualitative results of our simulation 
exercise showed that the existence of market power on some markets: 
• significantly modifies the implicit price of milk components; 
• could lead to an increase in EU exports as firms price discriminate among countries; with 
market power, domestic price is not the adequate indicator of competitiveness;  
• modify dramatically the distribution of surplus among agents; 
• is potentially an important source of welfare losses. Losses from market power exercise could 
be as high as welfare losses generated by distorting policies such as export subsidies policy. 
To conclude, this analysis suggests that agricultural economists should devote much more attention to 
imperfect competition in the agricultural and food sector. 
This simplified model of the dairy industry should now be extended to analyse a more general model 
that allows for allocation of milk components into several processed commodities to analyse precisely 
how market power modifies the allocation of commodities. 
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